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Foreword
By John Kershaw, VIPER Project Leader
Introduction
The VIPER microprocessor chip is one of the results of a research program on
high-integrity computing being carried out at the Royal Signals and Radar Es-
tablishment at Malvern, England. RSRE (which is a research station belonging
to the British Ministry of Defence) has been developing formal methods of spec-
ifying and analysing software for some 15 years, but only in 1983 did we begin
to look at the equally challenging problem of computer hardware.
Correctness of computer hardware has only become an issue because of the
pressure from computer users (civil and military) to put programmable elec-
tronics into ever more critical systems. The medical, automotive, and avionic
communities now all use general purpose microprocessors in systems which could
place the lives of their customers at risk, a_d the threshold is constantly being
pushed higher: computer control offers so many advantages in cost, perfor-
mance, and flexibility that its temptations are rarely resistible.
Conventional microprocessor chips, however, are neither well enough spec-
ified nor accurately enough implemented for life-critical (or security-critical)
applications. Every month sees another press report of problems in widely-used
devices. VIPER, like the FM8501 and 8502, was born of the need for a micro-
processor with a precise, formal, specification, the highest possible assurance
that the physical device conforms to it, and the special characteristics needed
for high-integrity applications.
Computational Logic Incorporated were commissioned by NASA to review
the work on VIPER, under a long-standing framework for collaboration in
aerospace research between NASA and the Royal Aerospace Establishment in
Britain. Information on VIPER was supplied by ourselves and by Marconi
Electronic Devices Ltd.
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The VIPER Design and Verification Process
VIPER was developed in response to a number of UK military requirements. We
made an early decision (in 1984) to fabricate chips as a demonstration of what
could be done, and therefore limited ourselves to technologies which offered a
reasonably quick route to silicon. Gordon's LCF-LSM system (which has now
matured into HOL, see the references at the end of the report) was the obvious
choice, since a full account of it had been published with a tutorial example of
hardware verification - a simple 8-bit machine now called "Tamarack."
HOL is syntactically quite similar to the hardware description language
ELLA, so we decided to live with an informal (though technically easy) step
in the design process by changing languages in the middle. A strongly-typed
language like HOL is a big help when writing a specification (it detects a large
proportion of errors) and a theorem prover for it is available. ELLA is an es-
tablished HDL with a wealth of tools, some of which can refine a block-level
description into a gate-level design with almost no human intervention. We
changed at the point of least effort; the process could easily be mechanised
though for a device as simple as VIPER this did not seem worth while.
From the language change downwards, the VIPER design was first verified
by a process of "intelligent exhaustive simulation" whose coverage depends on
the set of test vectors applied. These vectors (which contain "don't cares" in
profusion) are generated by the ELLA simulator from a hand-written program.
Though we believe this method to be sound (it is in fact pessimistic: it rejects
some correct circuits but should never accept a wrong one) it depends too much
on human assiduity for comfort, so we have replaced it. The new technique,
developed by Clive Pygott at RSRE and based on the work of R. E. Bryant, is
called NODEN; it was used in August 1989 to repeat the low-level verification
of the latest version of VIPER. This device (VIPER 1A) is designed to operate
in pairs and has built-in comparators to check for address and data bus errors.
The comparators have too many inputs for the NODEN analyser to check them,
but the rest of the design was confirmed to be correct.
The upper levels of the verification were done by Avra Cohn at the University
of Cambridge, England, using the HOL Theorem Prover. The proof is not
complete in a number of areas concerning the meaning of computer arithmetic;
these points have been documented by Cohn herself and are commented on
further in this report. We are confident from careful (but informal) argument,
simulation, and testing of actual chips that the implementation is correct, but
as Fetzer and others have pointed out it is not justified in strictly mathematical
terms to claim a "proof" of any physical device.
Hardware, of any kind, is fundamentally different from computer software in
that a truly formal proof (a "demonstration" in Fetzer's terms) of correctness
is not possible. Physical devices wear out and break down, and no amount of
formal logic can guarantee immunity: ultimately physics makes its own rules.
With VIPER we have put almost as much effort into guarding against hard-
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ware breakdown (using parity bits, master/slave operation, built-in test, and
self-testable logic) as into assuring correctness of the design. The two aspects
are of course complementary, for most redundant systems are built round the as-
sumption that the channels will fail independently. If there is a common design
fault, they may all fail together.
The Future
This report and Avra Cohn's work confirm our impression that more remains
to be done, both to build up confidence in the existing VIPER design and to
develop new techniques of design and verification which avoid the limitations
of present methods. CLI themselves are major contributors to this field; in the
UK we are sponsoring work on methods of refining a functional specification by
correctness preserving transformations, so that the eventual gate-level design is
"correct by construction." The first test vehicle for this work will probably be
a much faster (but upwards compatible) development of VIPER.
At the silicon level, we are insuring against faults in the CAD software
and manufacturing process (which are below the end-point of our verification
work) by sponsoring a second, independent, gate-level design of the chip using
a different technology.
In the longer term we feel that a combination of methods will usually be
needed to achieve the highest assurance. A design may be pronounced "correct
by construction" by a faulty software tool; to guard against this a separate
proof of implication could be carried out using different tools. At the level of
electrons and transistors formal logic is not very helpful, and the best safeguard
is to repeat the design process in as different a way as possible. Interchange
and co-operation between the various research teams is vitally important, and
we hope to build on the knowledge we have gained from CLI and NASA to
strengthen our own work and to provide secure foundations for VIPER and its
descendants.
RSRE Malvern, UK
Email: KERSHAW@HERM ES.MOD.UK
John Kershaw
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Chapter 1
Introduction
VIPER (Verifiable Integrated Processor for Enhanced Reliability) is a 32-bit
microprocessor architecture designed by the Royal Signals and Radar Estab-
lishment (RSRE) in Malvern, England [Ker84]. Recent technical and marketing
literature includes the following statements:
... formal mathematical methods have been used both to specify the
overall behaviour of the processor and to prove that the gate-level
realisations conform to this top-level specification. [CP87]
[Formal methods] were used in the development of VIPER, the first
commercially available microprocessor with a formal specification
and a proof that the chip conforms to it. [Dyk88]
The purpose of this report is to examine the claim that the gate-level design
of the VIPER microprocessor is mathematically verified. The sources for our
study of VIPER included a number of technical documents from RSRE and
Cambridge University. Additionally, in April, 1989, we personally interviewed
the VIPER design team and their Cambridge University verification consultants.
Although a great deal of effort has been expended on the formal specification
and verification of VIPER, there is not sufficient evidence to substantiate the
claim that the VIPER gate-level specification (the implementation netlist) has
been proven to implement its top-level specification (tile instruction interpreter).
This is not a unique point of view; a recent paper by one of the Cambridge
University consultants arrives at a similar conclusion [Coh89b].
Chapter 2 contains an informal description of the VIPER microprocessor.
The analysis of VIPER begins in Chapter 3 with an outline of the abstract lay-
ers used to specify VIPER. Chapter 4 covers each of the proofs, and attempted
proofs of correspondence between the levels in the specification. A schematic
block diagram of the contents of Chapters 3 and 4 appears as Figure 1.1. The
conclusion contains a discussion of some of the broader issues in managing for-
mal hardware verification projects, using the VIPER project as an example.
1 Q
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Throughout the report we contrast the specification and verification approach
used for VIPER with that used during the specification and verification of the
FM8502 microprocessor [Wat87].
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Figure 1.1: A schematic representation of tile specification and verification of
VIPER.
Chapter 2
The VIPER
M icroprocessor
The VIPER project was launched after the British Ministry of Defence became
increasingly concerned that computer hardware and software errors had caused
and would continue to cause loss of life. It was believed that the formal speci-
fication and verification of a microprocessor would yield an embedded-systems
platform whose operational characteristics were completely known. Some other
goals of the VIPER project, besides those stated in the VIPER design docu-
ments [Ker84], are listed below.
Design Stability. Different revisions of supposedly identical processors have
been found to behave differently even though these processors bear the
same part number. These differences are often the result of iterating
a design as the processor implementation technology matures. To avoid
this problem, VIPER implementations were to be verified before they were
produced, thus insuring all VIPER implementations would have identical
functionality.
Safety Critical Architecture. The VIPER architecture is straightforward
and simple. A simple architecture is easier to specify, verify, and use
correctly. To enhance the VIPER's use in safety-critical computing, the
VIPER designers added features which force the processor to halt under
various conditions. The VIPER enters a halt state whenever an unimple-
mented instruction is encountered, when the memory does not respond
within a fixed amount of time, an unexpected arithmetic overflow is de-
tected, etc.
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Reliable Systems. Formal verificationisnot insuranceagainstphysicalfail-
ures.The VIPERIA, a successorto the VIPERI, includesadditionalcir-
cuitrywhich allowstwo processorsto be operated as a self-checkingpair
[Pyg87,HP87]. If the computations of the two processorsever diverge,
then both processorswillhalt.
The above listpointsout the greatsuccessMOD has achievedwith the VIPER
project.They have implemented a safety-consciousarchitecture,and developed
dual-processorsystems capabilitywhich should provideenhanced reliability.
An informal,architectural-levelspecificationforVIPER appears in[Ker84].
VIPER isa 32-bitmachine with an accumulator,two index registers,a 20-bit
program counter, and a 1-bitflagregister.The processorsupports word ad-
dressingofseparate,2_° word I/O and memory spaces.Each 32-bitinstruction
consistsof a 12-bitopcode and a 20-bitliteralvalue or memory address. As
mentioned above, VIPER isdesigned to stop whenever an errorisencountered
during processing.The factthat the processorhas halted due to an erroris
detectableby means of a dedicatedoutput. The VIPER architecturedoes not
provideinterruptsor other kindsof exceptionsexcept as noted above.
Chapter 3
Form al Specification
The formal specification of VIPER is divided into four abstract levels, summa-
rized in Table 3.1. Starting from the top-level specification (most abstract),
each level becomes more and more concrete until a gate-level description (least
abstract) is reached. Partitioning the specification this way was inspired by
Gordon's specification and verification of a simple 12-bit processor modeled in
LCF_LSM [Gor81,Gor83]. Table 3.1 only lists the specifications published by
RSRE. For some of the proofs the LCF.LSM specifications were recast into the
derivative language HOL [Gor87] by consultants at Cambridge University. In
the following Sections we focus on the original versions and treat the HOL trans-
lations along with the proofs in Chapter 4. The specification style used in the
LCF.LSM specifications is not significantly altered by translation to HOL. It
is also instructive to examine some of the deficiencies in the original LCF_LSM
specifications, not all of which are solved in their HOL counterparts.
The VIPER Specification
Level Language(s) Reference
Top LCF_LSM
Major State LCF_LSM
Block LCF..LSM, Drawing; ELLA
Implementation ELLA; HILO, FDL
[Cui85]
[Cu186]
[Pyg86]
N/A
Table 3.1:Levelsinthe VIPER Specification,indecreasingorderofabstraction.
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3.1 The Top Level
3.1.1 Overview
At the top level, VIPER was specified as a function in LCF.LSM named NEXT.
Below we provide a schematic view of the operation of the function.
NEXT (rom,p,a,x,y,b,stop) -> (ram,p,a,x,y,b,stop)
NEXT takes the current programmer (visible) state (of seven components) and
computes a new (seven component) programmer state based on the instruc-
tion referenced by the program counter. The programmer state consists of the
registers a, x, and y, the program counter p, the multi-purpose flag b, the
"processor-stopped" flag stop, and the data and I/O memory space ram. NEXT
is an interpreter for a single instruction, which an assembly language program-
mer could use to predict the changes to the programmer state on the execution
of one instruction. This is similar to the specification function for the FM8502,
except that the FM8502 specification is an instruction interpreter for a processor
executing a sequence of instructions.
Due to the very abstract nature of the top-level specification for VIPER,
a number of the safety-critical features of the architecture do not appear. For
example, the NEXT specification includes the stop flag, but the top-level specifi-
cation function does not address all of the ways that real VIPER processors can
be forced to halt, e.g., through a memory timeout. Instead, NEXT implicitly as-
sumes a configuration in which the RESET, SINGLE-STEP, and ERROR inputs
to the physical processor are never asserted, and all memory accesses complete
normally. These assumptions are made explicit in the attempts to prove that
the block-level implementation (Section 3.3) correctly implements the top-level
specification. Since the top-level specification makes no account of any inputs
to the system, the specification does not really model I/O, even though the
I/O memory space is included in NEXT. In summary, when considering what
has been proved about VIPER with respect to the high-level specification, one
should realize that this specification does not cover every behavior, including
several important safety-critical behaviors.
These deficiencies were known to RSRE, but addressing them would have
required a radically different specification approach. Modeling memory timeout,
for example, would have necessitated some notion of time in the high-level spec-
ification, as well as a nondeterministic input to model memory acknowledgment.
At the time RSRE scientists began the work they did not feel confident in ex-
tending the specification methodology past the simple state-transition technique
which was employed [Cull.
We do not mean to suggest that these are trivial problems; the formalization
of peripheral behavior is an active area of research in hardware verification. For
example, the FM8502 specification employs the notion of an oracle, a parameter
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ADD32(r,m)
LET sum = WOED34((VAL33(SIGNEIT r)) + (VAL33(SIGNEXT m))) IN
LET opposite = (EL 31 (BITS32 r)) ZOg (EL 31 (BITS32 m)) IN
(TILIM34T032 sum, {sma_
(EL 32 (BITS34 sum)) XOE opposite, (carry}
((EL 32 (BITS34 sum)) XOR ((EL 31 (BITS34 sum))))) _overfloe}
Figure 3.1: Top-level specification of addition with carry and overflow for the
VIPER microprocessor.
to the low-level specification function which models the nondeterministic occur-
rence of RESET events and memory acknowledgments. The oracle abstraction
made it possible to formally state and prove that the FM8502 implementation
conforms to the top-level specification in the face of arbitrary delays from the
memory. Another proof connected the programmer's view of resetting the ma-
chine with the hardware-level reset.
3.1.2 Arithmetic Specifications
The arithmetic behavior of VIPER is described in terms of operations on natural
number abstractions of Boolean words. Interpreting these specifications is com-
plicated by the fact that two equivalent representations are used for Boolean
words in LCF.LSM and HOL: the built-in types wordn, and lists of Boolean
values. The top-level specification for addition in the ALU is presented in Fig-
ure 3.1. Hardware addition is defined as sign-extending 32-bit words to 33
bits (which involves an intermediate Boolean list), converting 33-bit words to
numbers, adding the numbers, converting the sum to a 34-bit word, and then
truncating this word to 32 bits. Computation of the carry and overflow are done
with list forms of some of the intermediate results.
The sum computed by ADD32 is a fairly straightforward definition of hard-
ware addition, although the sign-extension of the addends is never explained. 1
More significant is the fact that nowhere in the formal work on VIPER is it
ever demonstrated that ADD32 is an abstraction for either signed or unsigned
addition, nor is there ever any formal description of the significance of the carry
and overflow outputs of ADD32. Whereas the informal specification states that
"...overflow on either addition or subtraction causes the VIPER processor to
stop..." [Ker84], a statement about signed arithmetic, the formal specification
never mentions signed numbers. _ Thus the top-level specification leaves too
IAn unconvincing justification appears in the specification [Cu185]. At the block level
(Section 3.3), addition is defined by truncating the 33-bit result of a 32-bit addition.
_Signed integers are not a built-in type in LCF_LSM. They could have been modeled, for
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much unspecified about the arithmetic operation of the processor. This does
not mean that the top-level specification is wrong, simply that it is currently
unable to support formal arithmetic analysis at any level higher than uninter-
preted operations on Boolean words.
An example will clarify the above points. Imagine that a programmer had
written a VIPER program whose abstract specification was to compute the sum
of two signed integers. The programmer would like to prove the following:
If a, b, and ¢ are 32-bitwords in the VIPER system, and ifan
instructionisexecuted such that IIEIT places the sum output of
ADD32(a.b) into ¢, and ifthe ovez'_1ow output of ADD32(a,b) is
not set,and ifa,b,and c are the respectiveintegerabstractionsof
a,b and ¢ as32-bit,2'scomplement words, then c = a + b.
The programmer would further want to know that overflow is set only if a+ b is
an integer which can not represented as a 32-bit, 2's complement word. The top-
level specification of VIPER does not give the programmer the necessary tools to
carry out this proof: no abstraction function from Boolean words to integers is
provided, the result returned by ,tDD32 has no abstract interpretation as either a
signed or unsigned integer, and there is no formal definition of "representability"
by which to judge the correctness of the overflow bit.
In contrast, the specification of the FM8502 provides a complete founda-
tion for higher-level proofs. This was accomplished by proving a number of
theorems relating the hardware operations of the FM8502 to abstract functions
defining natural number and integer arithmetic. The complete specification
of the FM8502 enabled the development of a formally verified system which
includes a verified assembler and verified compiler [Moo88,You88].
3.2 The Major-State Machine
The next lower level of abstraction in the VIPER specification is the major.
state machine. The major-state level abstracts VIPER as a cyclic graph whose
nodes represent different phases of instruction execution, e.g., instruction-fetch,
perform-AI, U-operation, or read-memory. Each node in the major-state graph
is modeled by an LCF_LSM function that specifies how the programmer state
and internal state variables change as VIPER passes through the phases of
instruction processing. The only concept of time at this level is the implicit
ordering of the state transitions.
As specified by RSRE, the major state machine is not a single function in
LCF-LSM, but rather a collection of functions with only an informal connection.
In other words, RSRE's major-state specification cannot be used as a simulator
for VIPER in the same way that the top-level specification can. Recasting the
example, a_sa sign/magnitude pair.
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specification into HOL for purposes of formal proof (Section 4.3) necessitated
the introduction of a new formal framework which is not present in the original
specification, i.e., a framework which connects the individual state functions
into a single function. Both the LCF.LSM and HOL versions continue to ignore
external reset, 3 stop on external error, and memory timeout.
The major-state level was an attempt to bridge the gap between the high-
level and low-level specifications, in order to simplify the formal correspondence
proofs. Although two proofs (described in Chapter 4) involve this specification
level, neither factors into the final correctness argument for VIPER hardware.
We also point out in Section 4.3 that the original LCF.LSM specification was
incorrect, in the sense that it was not equivalent to the top-level specification.
There is no equivalent of the major-state level in the FM8502 specification.
3.3 The Block-Level Specification
A block is an abstract description of a major subsystem of the processor, e.g., the
register file, instruction decoder, the ALU, etc. Each block has three equivalent
specifications: RSRE's published LCF_LSM version, the HOL translation of the
LCF_LSM used for formal proofs (Section 4.4), and an unpublished counterpart
in the ELLA [MPT84] simulation language used for Intelligent Exhaustion sim-
ulation (Section 4.1). The block-level specification utilizes a register-transfer
representation for sequential hardware. All of the registers are assumed to be
activated by a common clock, and the block-level specification functions specify
the behavior of the combinational logic. The latches never appear explicitly in
the LCF_LSM or HOL versions. Instead, registers are modeled as parameters of
the block-level functions. Whether an input argument or computed value is to
be implemented as a latch is only informally specified by means of text and draw-
ings. Latches are explicitly represented in the ELLA descriptions. In contrast,
the FM8502 specification utilized a stylized hardware description methodology
which makes apparent which parameters represent sequential state.
As with the major-state model, RSRE's LCF_LSM specification is partial;
there is no formal description of the complete VIPER processor at the block
level. This is a serious flaw, since an indispensable component of the original
specification of VIPER is a schematic drawing that indicates the intended inter-
connection of the blocks. Connecting the block-level models to create a usable
formal specification in HOL was a major hurdle in the high-level proof attempt
(Section 4.4). The translation from LCF_LSM to HOL also uncovered a number
of syntactic and typographical errors in the LCF_LSM specifications [Coh89a].
The block-level specification is also flawed by the need for the co-specification
in ELLA. RSRE felt that it would have been prohibitively complicated to at-
tempt gate-level verification against the block model using LCF_LSM [CP87],
_The specification does include a BESET state, but since external events are not modeled
there is no way to enter that state.
The Formal Specification and Partial Verification of VIPER
Technical Report i_46
11
and originally specified the block-level machine in ELLA. We comment further
on the problems of the dual specification in Section 4.1.3.
3.4 The Implementation-Level Specification
The implementation-level specifications were produced by Marconi Electronic
Devices, Ltd. and Plessey Company plc. The VIPER implementations were
created from the block-level descriptions of VIPER. Two descriptions of each
implementation actually exist: the circuit netlist in a proprietary CAD lan-
guage, and translations of the netlists into ELLA which were used during Intel-
ligent Exhaustion simulation (Section 4.1.1). The gate-level specifications are
considered proprietary information, and are not publicly available.
The transfer from a formal specification language into an informal one, such
as a hardware design language, is a weak link in the formal hardware verifi-
cation process. The RSRE specification of VIPER is further weakened by the
necessity of two informal translations: the translation of the gate-level models
from proprietary languages to ELLA, and the translation of the ELLA descrip-
tions of the block model to LCF.LSM and HOL. It is not possible to prove the
correctness of either translation due to the lack of a formal theory relating the
different languages. I
In contrast, the low-level specification of the FM8502 can be viewed as a
gate-level specification, in the sense that the specification can be formally ex-
panded down to simple functions abstracting gates and registers. Although it
has not been done, it would be possible to translate this formal expansion into
a commercial CAD language in a single informal step. No special-purpose inter-
mediate language was needed for the FM8502 verification because of the power
of the Boyer-Moore theorem prover in dealing with induction, and the built-in
Boolean decision procedure which simplified low-level proofs.
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3.5 Specification Summary
The formal specification of VIPER is partitioned into four levels of abstraction.
At the highest level, RSRE described VIPER with decreasingly abstract sets of
functions in LCF.LSM. At the lowest level of abstraction are the gate-level mod-
els in proprietary CAD languages. The block-level and gate-level specifications
are also given in the ELLA simulation language.
We noted several deficiencies in RSRE's specifications:
• There is no notion of external events in the top-level specification. Many
of the safety-critical design features, such as externally forced error resets
and memory timeouta, cannot be considered at this level.
• The top-level specification is incomplete with regard to the arithmetic
operations which VIPER is said to provide. It impossible to use the top-
level specification to prove abstract properties of programs running on
VIPER computers.
• There is no complete formal description of the block-level machine (al-
though Cohn later created one). The RSRE block-level specification only
describes individual blocks; blocks are related to each other by informal
text and drawings. The style used in the block-level specification was
apparently geared toward low-level verification, without consideration for
how it would be used in proofs at higher levels.
• There is no formal connection between the LCF_LSM and ELLA block-
level specifications.
Chapter 4
P roofs and P roof A ttem pts
The VIPER verification effort includes proofs by two diverse groups Over a
three year period. The first proofs were carried out by RSRE without me-
chanical assistance. Later, Avra Cohn of Cambridge University was engaged to
perform mechanical proofs using the HOL theorem prover. RSRE planned to
verify VIPER in several steps, which when composed would constitute a formal
verification of the processor. Three proof steps were to link the four abstract
specification layers: Top _ Major State, Major State _ Block, and
Block ¢==_ Implementation. A complete HOL proof linking Top ¢=:¢. Major-
State was produced by Cohn. No HOL proof was attempted for the Ma-
jor State ¢==_ Block correspondence; instead, an HOL proof of Top _ Block
was attempted but never completed. There is no formal proof relating the block-
level specification to the implementation, only an incomplete argument based
on Intelligent Exhaustion simulation.
A briefly annotated, chronological list of the proofs and proof attempts can
be found in Table 4.1. We discuss the nature and status of these proofs and
proof attempts in the sections which follow. We follow the chronology, beginning
at the implementation level and ending at the top level.
4.1 Block Implementation
The first analyses of the VIPER specification were designed to show that the
gate-level implementations proposed by the manufacturers correctly implemented
the block-level specifications. Since the block-level specifications only deal with
the combinational behavior of the blocks, this correspondence could have been
demonstrated by exhaustive simulation. RSRE introduced a method called In-
telligent Exhaustion (henceforth IE) which attempts to deliver the certainty of
exhaustive simulation without explicit simulation of every possible input pat-
tern. The remainder of this Section consists of an introduction to the IE tech-
13
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VIPER Proof Efforts
Levels Ref. Notes
Block ¢==_ Implementation [Pyg85]
Top _ Major State
Top ¢=_ Major State
Top _ Block
[CP85,CuI86]
[Coh87]
[Coh89a]
ELLA specifications were
analyzed by Intelligent Ex-
haustion simulation. The
reference is to the method;
the analyses are not docu-
mented.
A hand proof, later invali-
dated. The first reference
is to the method, the sec-
ond documents the proof at-
tempt.
A machine-checked proof,
using HOL versions of the
(corrected) specifications.
A formal analysis in HOL;
not a finished proof.
Table 4.1: Analyses of the VIPER specification, in chronological order.
nique, followed by a discussion of the application of IE to the VIPER verification
and the problems with connecting the low-level proofs to the higher levels. Al-
though the low-level specifications were extensively analyzed, this analysis does
not constitute a formal proof of the Block _ Implementation correspon-
dence.
4.1.1 Intelligent Exhaustion Technique
Intelligent Exhaustion (IE) is a verification methodology which could be im-
plemented in a number of high-level digital simulation systems. IE verification
involves the simulation of one or more special purpose circuits encoded in a
behavioral simulation language. In brief, gate-level and behavioral models of
the circuit are simultaneously simulated, and the outputs of the two models are
compared by a device which is also encoded in the simulation language.
If the behavioral and gate-level models agree on all possible inputs, then the
two models are identical, although in general this would require the simulation of
an exponential number of tests. IE exploits the fact that the values of functions
are often determined by a proper subset of their input values. For example
the output of a hardware AND gate will be low if one of the inputs is low;
the value of the other input is irrelevant in that case. Irrelevant signal values
can be modeled with unknown or indeterminate states, which are well-known
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abstractions for digital logic simulation [BF76]. Since simulating a circuit with
an indeterminate input is equivalent to simulating both high and low values for
that input, intelligent analysis by the engineer can reduce the number of input
patterns required to completely test the functionality of a combinational circuit.
As long as it can be shown that every possible input has been considered, then
IE is equivalent to exhaustive simulation. This condition is easy to check; for
example a simple program can verify that a set of n-bit vectors which include
indeterminate states actually covers all 2'* possibilities.
In practice, however, IE analyses are more complicated than suggested by
the preceding paragraph. For example, if a device has several loosely correlated
outputs, the most efficient verification may require a separate IE simulation for
each output. Therefore it may also need to be shown that the IE simulations
cover every output. This is not as straightforward as checking input coverage,
since complete output coverage can only be determined by a careful examination
of the behavioral source code. Another complication is that the behavior of a
combinational circuit may only be specified for a subset of all possible inputs.
For these cases it only needs to be shown that the inputs cover all interesting
behavior. This requires a careful statement of exactly what the interesting cases
are, and a corresponding proof that all of these cases have been considered.
Arithmetic circuits, like adders, also cause problems. For example, the IE
verification of the carry output of an n-bit adder requires the simulation of
0(2 "+2) patterns. While IE may provide economical verification of some types
of circuits, it seems that the application of the method to arithmetic circuits
will always be limited to relatively small devices; the combinatorial explosion is
inescapable. RSRE also discovered cases where IE is too pessimistic, and would
lead one to believe that correct circuits are incorrect [Pyg88].
4.1.2 Application to VIPER
tLSRE implemented IE in the ELLA simulator, in part because the ELLA system
had interfaces to the proprietary CAD systems used in the actual fabrication
of VIPER. The block-level specification of VIPER was originally developed in
ELLA, whereas the manufacturers provided gate-level realizations of the block-
level designs in the proprietary CAD languages HILO and FDL. These gate-
level designs were automatically translated to ELLA for IE simulation. The
IE simulations uncovered errors in the initial designs "that would have been
virtually impossible to find by simulation" [Pyg85].
The low-level verification of VIPER by Intelligent Exhaustion remains in-
complete, however, for two important reasons. Most importantly, RSRE never
proved that the input patterns used for IE simulation provided complete cover-
age of every possible case [Pyg]. The complete IE analysis of VIPER required
the development and simulation of more than 6000 patterns [Pyg85]. There
is no proof that these 6000 test patterns completely exercise the block-level
specifications.
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There is also no formalized argument that the implementations of the VIPER
ALU meet the block-level specification. Recall that IE does not mitigate the
combinatorial nature of verification of arithmetic circuits. In particular, IE sim-
ulation could not be performed on the entire 32-bit ALU. Instead, the ALU was
partitioned into 8, 4-bit slices and associated "glue" logic for carry-lookahead.
IE was only used to show that the 4-bit slices were correct; the correctness
of the complete ALU is only supported by traditional engineering arguments.
Since the later proof which begins at the block level (see Section 4.4) assumes a
complete, 32-bit ALU, there remains an unverified gap between the block-level
ALU specification, and the subcircuits that were analyzed with IE.
4.1.3 Interface to Higher Levels
Verification of the electronic block model of VIPER is not an end in itself, hut
has to be considered as a part of the overall verification effort. The block-level
specification exists in two forms: the LCF.LSM which forms the basis for high-
level verification, and the co-specification in ELLA. The LCF_LSM version was
created by hand-translating ELLA to LCF_LSM. ELLA is not an LCF_LSM
simulator; a number of subtle differences between the two representations are
documented in [Pyg85]. For example the ELLA specification employs data
types not available in LCF.LSM. There are also a number of ramifications of thee
presence of indeterminate states in ELLA with respect to interpreting LCF_LSM
specifications.
The use of different languages in a verification effort increases the chance
of errors, either in the translation process, or errors caused by differences in
the semantics of the languages. In the case of VIPER, conjectures verified by
IE simulation of the ELLA models are used as axioms in the high-level proofs
based on the LCF_LSM versions of the specification, in spite of the fact that
there is no formal connection between the two languages.
In the case of the formal systems built on the FM8502, a uniform logical
theory (the Boyer-Moore logic) was used from the gate-level descriptions all the
way up to the specification of a high-level programming language. All of the
correctness proofs were checked with the Boyer-Moore theorem prover, which
ensures that all of the proof obligations have been discharged.
4.1.4 Summary
We are not convinced that RSRE researchers have formally verified the gate-
level implementation of VIPER. It was never verified that the IE test patterns
provided complete coverage, and there is no proof that the complete ALU de-
signs are correct. Even if the IE analysis of VIPER were to be completed there
still remains the gap between the LCF_LSM and ELLA specifications, bridged
only by informal arguments. The VIPER verification would be much more be-
lievable and satisfying if a uniform theory had been used at every level, and if
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RSRE had completed all of the proof obligations of the methodology in use.
4.2 Top Major-State (LCF_LSM)
Cullyer reported a proof, worked by hand, which showed that the major-state
machine correctly implements the top-level VIPER specification. This proof
attempt was carried out completely within the LCF.LSM framework, as Cullyer
used the LCF_LSM specifications. Cohn later demonstrated that the major-
state specification was wrong, thus invalidating this work (see Section 4.3).
This failed attempt is important if for no other reason than to demonstrate the
desirability of mechanically checked proofs.
4.3 Top Major-State (HOL)
Desiring machine-checked, formal proofs of correctness, and fi_eling that it lacked
the requisite experience in-house, RSRE contracted the Hardware Verification
group at Cambridge University to produce high-level proofs of correctness for
VIPER. Tile first proof, which showed the correspondence between the top-
level specification and the major-state macMne, was published in 1987 [Coh87].
Cohn reported that this proof required six months to complete, and involved
over one million primitive inferences. Due to a change of plans (see Section 4.4)
this proof is only of historical interest, and does not play any role in the formal
correctness argument for VIPER.
Cohn began by translating the LCF.LSM specifications into the higher-order
logic HOL IGor87]. Since HOL was derived from LCF_LSM, the translation
of the top-level and major-state specification from LCF_LSM into HOL was
straightforward. The proof of equivalence also required Cohn to augment the
original specifications in two respects. Recall that the major-state machine was
modeled as a set of functions representing different phases of instruction ex-
ecution, without any formal connection between the states. Cohn formalized
the connection by combining all of the state transition functions into a single
function. Cohn also formalized a notion of time, where each unit of time rep-
resented one transition in the major-state machine. Again, proofs at this level
ignore the possibility of reset and memory timeout since these eventualities are
not represented in the specifications.
Several blatant errors in the LCF_LSM major-state machine specification
were uncovered during the proof. During the fetch cycle, for example, the check
for illegal instructions was specified to be made against the previous contents
of the instruction register, not against the instruction just fi,tched. Since tlw
ma.ior-staI.c ma,'hinc was an almtracti_3u created I\_r pr_of, am[ n,_l an int,'gra[
i_;trl, t_J"I.Jlt"&'sign, i.Jwsc ,'rrtws are not nl;I.nifesi_'d ill t.h," actual devices.
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4.4 Top Block
Cohn next considered the verification of the major-state machine with respect
to the block-level specification. This approach was abandoned for technical
reasons. Instead, Cohn attempted to prove the correspondence of the block-level
specification with respect to the top-level specification directly. This effort did
not result in a finished proof that the block-level machine correctly implements
the VIPER top-level specification.
Cohn's first challenge was to convert the block-level specification into a form
that was amenable to formal analysis. Recall from Section 3.3 that the block-
level specification consists of a set of LCF.LSM functions, schematic drawings,
and text. Using these sources Cohn created an HOL function which is believed
to faithfully capture the intention of the VIPER designers for the block-level
machine. This function is more complex than the VIPER major-state specifica-
tion, as each major state is further divided into a number of minor states. The
tIOL block-level specification function was then expanded, using definitions and
simplification iemmas, to produce what is essentially a symbolic execution of
the block-level machine for each po6sible VIPER instruction schema. Cohn also
proved that the expansion did cover every instruction schema.
To finish the proof, it would be necessary to prove that the results computed
by the block-level specification match the top-level specification. Paraphrasing
Cohn, this step was not taken because
1. Resources were limited, and the research results would not justify the
effort.
2. No one had developed an IJOL theory of bit-string operations, which is
critical for completing the proof.
3. Relating the high-level results to the block-level results might require in-
tricate knowledge of the design to understand exactly how the low-level
design implements the specification.
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Top:
gOKDS32
(v
(TL
(TL
(BITS34
(WOKDS34
((VAL33 (SIGNKXT (KEGSF/.ECT_ABBIL(azeg, xreg, yreg,preg, ram)))) +
(VAL33 (SIGIEXT (gE__ABBIL(ramopre 8) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
Block:
WORDS32
(V
(s_.a
(o,31)
(BZTS33
(WOILD33
((V&L32 (REGSELECT_ABBI_(areg, xreg,yreg,preg,ram))) +
(VAL32 (HEI_ hBBR(ram,preg) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
Figure 4.1: Derived computations for an ADD operation for the VIPER top-
level and block-level specifications.
Instead, Cohn delivered the symbolic expansion to the VIPER design team,
who informally analyzed it and found no obvious errors. Quoting from [Coh89a]
(the italics are Cohn's):
For the non-ALU sequences, the results are not very complicated
and they appear to be as intended. Some of the arithmetic-logic
paths are also apparently correct. Others, in particular the addi-
tions, subtractions, and comparisons, are neither obviously correct
nor incorrect, and require further study. So far, there do not seem
to be any definitely incorrect results, but obviously, since the formal
analysis ends at this point, there very well could be. For that reason,
a great deal of care should be taken in describing the Viper block
model as being 'verified'; it has to date only been analyzed ...and
inspected ...
Cohn goes on to give examples of the types of obstacles remaining. For ex-
ample, Figure 4.1 displays the result computed by the ALU during an addition,
first from the top-level specification, then from the block-level specification. The
informal argument is simple: both expressions compute the low-order 32 bits
from addition of two 32-bit words. In the expression from the top level, the
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result is obtained by truncating the 34-bit result of a sign-extended addition; at
the block level, a 33-bit value is truncated. This is an example where it is fairly
"obvious" that the two levels compute the same value. Cohn also gives other
examples in which the correspondence between levels is far less clear. Unfortu-
nately, the lemmas about bit-vector operations that were needed to prove the
correspondence were never developed.
The status of this proof attempt is unchanged since the publication of
[Coh89a]. There is no indication that this proof will ever be completed.
4.5 Proof Summary
Several attempts were made to prove correspondence between the various levels
in the VIPER specification. These efforts were undertaken by RSRE and re-
searchers at Cambridge University over a three-year period. So far there is no
complete proof that the gate-level specifications implements the top-level speci-
fications. RSRE used Intelligent Exhaustion simulation to analyze the gate-level
implementations. The most satisfying formal work on VIPER is Cohn's proof
that the major-state machine correctly implements the top-level specification.
Unfortunately, this proof has no formal connection with any of the other proof
attempts, except that the same HOL top-level specification was used for the
Top ¢==_ Block analysis. The final attempt to prove that the block-level
model is equivalent to the top-level specification was prematurely terminated,
but carried to the point that the results are at least plausibly correct. None of
these efforts address resetting the machine, memory timeout, forced error, or
single step modes.
A satisfactory completion of this work would require at least:
• The adoption of a more rigorous framework for gate-level verification than
that provided by Intelligent Exhaustion.
A formal proof that the gate-level ALU, which was partitioned in order
to be analyzed by Intelligent Exhaustion, correctly implements the block
level specification.
• The completion of Cohn's Block Level _ Top Levelproof.
• The specification of integers, along with integer operation appearing in
the top-level specification.
Until these conditions are met, the claims that VIPER has been formally verified
are unfounded.
Chapter 5
C onclusion
VIPER has been verified in the traditional hardware engineering sense, i.e., ex-
tensively simulated and informally checked. Before we would be satisfied that
VIPER was verified in the formal sense, we would expect to see complete formal
specifications at every hierarchical level, from the top-level instruction inter-
preter down to the gate-level design. Accompanying these specifications should
be proofs which showed that the gate-level design correctly implements the
top-level machine. These conditions could never have been met using RSRE's
original specification and proof methodology. We pointed out several of these
deficiencies, including the use of the informal simulation language ELLA for the
gate-level specification, the lack of rigor in the Intelligent Exhaustion analyses,
and the incomplete nature of RSRE's block-level specification. These points,
and the fact that the attempt to prove the correspondence between the top-level
and block-level machines in HOL is incomplete, lead us to the conclusion that
VIPER has not been formally verified.
The VIPER work serves as a case study for several technology transfer issues,
clearly demonstrating a need for improved formal systems. Although verifica-
tion methods are an active area of research, application of these methods must
eventually be placed in the hands of hardware designers, or specially trained
engineers who are intimately familiar with the designs. It is significant that
Hunt was an experienced hardware designer prior to the successful verification
of the FM8501. Cohn was not, which only added to the problems caused by
attempting an after-the-fact verification of an unfamiliar specification.
There is also a need to improve the Boolean decision procedures in mechani-
cal reasoning systems, in order to avoid the necessity for special purpose methods
such as Intelligent Exhaustion. ['or example, Bryant [Bry86] recently introduced
a set of algorithms which provide extremely fast verification of Boolean circuits.
It should be possible to soundly implement similar procedures in currently ex-
isting systems.
The VIPER project also pointed out the need for extensive libraries of lem-
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mas about arithmetic and logical operations on the basic data types found in
hardware specifications. This absence, and the presumed difficulty of creating
these lemmas in HOL was one of the reasons that Cohn's last proof attempt
was prematurely terminated. Something also clearly needs to be done about the
large amount of detailed interaction required to complete a complex hardware
proof using a mechanical assistant.
There are different degrees of rigor possible when applying formal meth-
ods to hardware design: hand-written specifications, hand proofs, mechanically
recorded specifications, and mechanical proofs. The VIPER effort employed
all of these techniques with varying degrees of success, but it is clear that the
VIPER team was more thorough at specifying the abstract behavior of VIPER
than traditional engineering techniques would allow. Without the use of formal
techniques, the proofs of correctness could not have even been attempted. We
are encouraged by the use of formal techniques in VIPER, as their use demon-
strates what we believe to be a new paradigm in computer hardware specification
and validation.
In conclusion, we admire the efforts of the groups at RSRE and Cambridge
who took on a formidable verification task. We don't consider the shortcomings
of the VIPER project as a pessimistic indication of the future of formal hardware
verification. We are optimistic that the problems uncovered in the VIPER effort
can be overcome, and that this hard-won experience will benefit future work.
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